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Abstract:
The paper analyses role of military spending and number of military personnel in India 
and Pakistan in conflict mitigation. The paper finds that Pakistan’s military spending is a 
cause of deterrence from Indian hegemony in the region confirming the defence literature 
that puts the role of military as a strategic asset for a country. The paper also suggests that 
both democracy and economic development puts downward pressures on India and 
Pakistan hostilities however democracy is not a sufficient condition in itself to mitigate 
conflict. The innovation of the paper is that it constructs real proxies of conflict from the 
defence literature and utilizes defence spending in the analysis as a means to a peaceful 
resolution between bilateral issues within South Asian region.
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technological contest between one man's bid for freedom and the technocrat who had chosen him for destruction. 
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1. Introduction: Rational behind Military Spending?
One of the main duties of a sovereign country is to protect its territory and people from 
violence emanating from other countries or from non-state actors such as terrorist groups. 
This duty can mainly be performed by means of military power. There is a substantial body 
of theoretical and empirical literature in political science and economics that seeks to explain 
defense spending. The theoretical explanations can be classified in three categories: (1) arms 
races; (2) organizational and bureaucratic politics; and (3) economic welfare maximization. 
The arms race literature, following Richardson (1960), explains time-series patterns of 
military expenditure in terms of action-reaction behavior between two rivals. It identifies 
three major influences: (a) the military spending of the other nation (rival) in the threat 
system (the ‘reaction’, ‘defense’ coefficient); (b) the economic burden of defense (the ‘fatigue 
coefficient’); and (c) the underlying grievances held by one nation against the other (the 
‘grievance’ coefficient). The arms-race model of military expenditure seems more suitable for 
countries involved in conflict or engaged in an enduring rivalry, such as the US–USSR Cold 
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(Mintz et al., 1990), and the Greek–Turkish relationships (Kollias and Makrydakis, 1997). In 
these cases the military preparedness of the other represents the overwhelming security 
issue/consideration. The organizational and bureaucratic politics explanation emphasizes 
‘incrementalism’ and bargaining over the defense budget, starting from the status quo. It 
implies that the best predictor of new increments to military spending is simply the 
increments of the immediate past; that is, the main determinant of this year’s defense budget 
is last year’s budget (Correa and Kim, 1992). The economics literature tends to ignore 
bureaucratic or political processes. It uses a standard neo-classical model in which a nation-
state is represented as a rational agent who maximizes a welfare function depending on 
security and economic variables subject to a budget constraint. Defense spending balances 
the welfare benefits of extra security derived from military expenditure against its 
opportunity costs in terms of forgone civilian output (Dunne and Perlo-Freeman, 2001; 
Avramides, 1997; Smith, 1995). Economic resources are usually proxied by GDP; external 
threat by military spending in the nation’s rival(s) as well as in country’s allies; domestic 
economic factors by variables such as the budget deficit, inflation, unemployment; political 
variables, by variables such as the ideology of the political party in power and the electoral 
cycle. Most studies on the demand for military spending employ time-series analysis for 
individual countries but there are also a few cross-sectional studies (for instance, Dunne and 
PerloFreeman, 2001). Country studies have produced mixed results for the main 
determinants of defense spending, making it difficult to come up with useful generalizations.
Developing countries have enough problems without either the waste of resources 
constituted by military expenditure, or the social and economic destruction brought about by 
warfare. Some of the strongest empirical influences on military expenditure reflect either 
neighborhood arms races, or the patronage demands of politically powerful military 
establishments. Both of these problems are potentially addressable. One of the other major 
influences on military expenditure in developing countries is internal rebellion. Where civil 
wars are ongoing military expenditure is greatly elevated. Further, there is evidence that 
governments set their defense expenditure at levels designed to deter such rebellions. Since, 
poor economic performance is a major risk factor, high military expenditure, by contributing 
to such poor performance, may inadvertently contribute to the risks that it is attempting to 
reduce. Both military expenditure and war retard development. This is not surprising, but 
there is now reasonable quantitative evidence on the scale of the effects. Military expenditure 
diverts government resources that could be put to better use – public services, infrastructure, 
or lower taxes. 
For developing countries, the adverse effects of a given level of military expenditure on 
income are probably even more costly than for the global average. In developed countries 
such expenditure may in part be concealed routes for providing subsidies to high-tech firms, 
hence the term “military-industrial complex.” In the poorer developing countries military 
equipment is imported, rather than produced domestically and so does not offer any side-
benefits to technical progress. For developing countries by far the most common form of 
war is civil war. Whereas international warfare is often quite brief, civil wars last a long time 
– typically around seven years. Such wars are getting longer – they now appear to continue 
for around three times as long as the civil wars prior to 1980. The cost of civil war is 
considerable. During the war the growth rate is typically reduced by around 2 percent. The 
losses can sometimes continue post-war: for example, people may continue to move their 
wealth out of the country due to perceived high risks of further conflict. Such perceptions 
would often not be misplaced. 
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devote a significant proportion of their resources to military spending which, as discussed 
above, actually retards growth and so accentuates that poverty. The global average for 
military spending is around 3.5 percent of GDP, but the ranges from virtually zero, to an 
astonishing 45 percent. Five factors are driving these large differences: 1. Active international 
warfare 2. Peacetime military budget inertia 3. Neighborhood effects (arms races) 4. Internal 
rebellion or civil war 5. Beneficiaries and vested interests The most obvious is that high 
military expenditure is sometimes a response to active warfare. 
There are also large differences in military spending among countries that are at peace. We 
find that one important influence on spending is if there is a past history of international 
war. Countries that have such a history spend around 1.3 percent of GDP more than 
countries that have not. Possibly this reflects an assessment of the higher risk of future 
conflict. However, it may also reflect inertia or political interests – once a country has built a 
large military, as happens during war, there are internal forces maintaining the level of 
government expenditure. Such persistence would not be surprising; it is indeed common in 
other areas of public expenditure. To the extent that a past war raises military expenditure 
because of a perceived higher risk of further war, it reflects fear of neighbors, or aggressive 
intentions towards them. We might therefore expect that the level of military expenditure 
chosen by a government would, to an extent, be influenced by the level chosen by its 
neighbors. This is indeed what we find. That is, the average level of spending of neighboring 
countries significantly influences the level chosen by a government. This can be interpreted 
in various ways, the most obvious of which is that of a neighborhood arms race. For most 
countries the most serious external threat comes from their neighbors and so the appropriate 
level of deterrence is set by the behavior of neighbors. A different interpretation of the same 
phenomenon is that military expenditure is set by regional norms of behavior, in a form of 
emulation. If the neighbors are spending a particular share of national income on defense, 
then the chiefs of the military, or the minister of defense, have a relatively easy case to argue 
with the minister of finance, that their own country should spend approximately at the same 
level. Whatever the interpretation, the consequence of this regional spillover effect is that 
military expenditure is, in effect, a regional public bad. Each time one country raises its 
military expenditure there will be a ripple effect across the region. Further, as neighbors 
respond to the initial increase, the country that increased its military expenditure may itself 
respond with further increases – the classic process of an arms race. We estimate that the 
typical multiplier from an initial increase in spending in one country to the new 
neighborhood equilibrium may involve both the country and its neighbors having increased 
the level of spending by around three times the initial increase. While the threat of 
international war is clearly one concern that might motivate military spending, for most 
developing country governments internal rebellion is a far more likely threat than 
international war. Currently, civil wars are around ten times as common as international 
wars. Thus, military expenditure may often be motivated by the desire to defend the 
government from the threat of rebellion. 
The above motivations for military expenditure have either been to fight a war or to deter it. 
However, these are not the only motivations for military spending. As with other forms of 
public expenditure, military expenditure has beneficiaries. In developed countries these 
beneficiaries are largely industrial companies that produce military hardware. Developing 
countries largely import such hardware and so the domestic beneficiaries are predominantly 
military employees. We might therefore expect that where military employees have a lot of 
influence over government decisions, the government will be persuaded to choose a higher 
level of military expenditure. This is a natural tendency – if professors were in charge of a 
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proposition because there is one readily observable circumstance in which military 
employees indeed have considerable influence over government decisions, namely if the 
government is a military dictatorship. Indeed, where the military is in charge of the 
government, military efficiency is likely to decline since there is no independent source of 
scrutiny and evaluation of performance. Some of these motivations suggest that military 
expenditure could be considerably lower without sacrificing interests that are worthwhile. To 
the extent that high spending reflects neighborhood arms races, it is potentially feasible to 
negotiate mutual reductions in spending. Since most developing countries receive aid 
inflows, it might conceivably be possible to strengthen confidence in such agreements by 
linking them to the conditions for aid eligibility. This might be done in the context of 
voluntarism: that is, a neighborhood might request the international community to assist the 
enforcement of its agreement. However, aid donors might also reasonably require that 
countries in receipt of aid inflows should avoid large levels of military expenditure. Such a 
use of donor conditionality could arise both to promote neighborhood arms reduction, and 
to discipline military governments that would otherwise indulge their own sector in excessive 
expenditure. (see Collier, P, 2006; pp 1-5)
2. Literature Review on the Dynamics of Military Spending: Empirical versus 
Theoretical Models
There is now a large body of empirical literature investigating the economic effects of 
military spending, with little consensus as to what these effects might be. The early cross-
country correlation analyses of Benoit (1973; 1978) quickly gave way to a variety of 
econometric models, reflecting different theoretical perspectives. Keynesian, neoclassical and 
structuralist models were applied using a variety of specifications, econometric estimators 
and types of sample in cross-section, timeseries or panels. The diversity of results led to 
arguments for case studies of individual countries and relatively homogeneous groups of 
countries. Dunne (1996) provides a survey of this work. The mainstream growth literature 
has not found military expenditure to be a significant factor in explaining growth. For 
instance, Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) consider 67 variables, including the initial share of 
military spending, as possible determinants of growth 1960-1996 in a cross-section of 88 
countries. Using Bayesian averaging, they find 18 variables that appear significant, with a 
posterior inclusion probability of better than 10%. The share of military spending ranks 45, 
with a probability of 2.1%. There are many similar findings. In contrast to this, many papers 
in the defence economics literature have found military expenditure to be a significant 
determinant of growth. The difference seems to come largely from the use of different 
models. In defence economics the Feder-Ram model tends to be widely used, while it is not 
used in the mainstream growth literature. Given the disjunction between the mainstream 
growth literature and the defence economics literature it seems useful to provide a review of 
the issues and contrast the approaches. However, there are other approaches that suggest 
that defence economics may be able to contribute to the growth debate. 
The vast literature on the economic effects of military expenditure has suggested a large 
number of different channels through which military expenditure may influence output. 
Smith (2000) and Dunne (1996), provide more detail and references, but here we will briefly 
list them to indicate the range of possibilities, rather than provide references or evaluation. 
They can be broadly grouped into demand effects, supply effects and security effects. 
Demand effects operate through the level and composition of expenditure. The most 
obvious is the Keynesian multiplier effect, an exogenous increase in military spending 
increases demand and, if there is spare capacity, increases utilisation and reduces 
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military expenditure by the government’s need to manage demand. Military expenditures 
have opportunity costs and may crowd out other forms of expenditure, such as investment. 
The extent and form of crowding out following an increase in military spending will depend 
on prior utilisation and how the increase is financed. The government budget constraint 
requires that an increase in military expenditure be financed by: cuts in other public 
expenditure, increased taxes, increased borrowing or expansion in the money supply. There 
is a large literature on war finance. The way the increase is financed will have further effects, 
e.g. a larger deficit may raise real interest rates, which feeds back on the economy. Increases 
in military expenditure will also change the composition of industrial output, with input-
output effects. Similar arguments apply to cuts in military expenditure, though the effects 
may not be symmetric. Supply effects operate through the availability of factors of 
production (labour, physical and human capital and natural resources) and technology, which 
together determine potential output. Some of the demand effects, e.g. crowding out of 
investment, may also have supply effects by changing the capital stock. The literature differs 
in whether the focus is on total output, including that used by the military, or just civilian 
output. Conscription and other forms of coercion as well as ideological fervour may increase 
the mobilisation of factors of production, particularly during times of perceived threat of 
war, but the resources mobilised are mainly used for military purposes. Clearly resources 
used by the military are not available for civilian use, but there may be externalities. Training 
in the armed forces may make workers more or less productive when they return to civilian 
employment. Military R&D may have commercial spin-offs. Security of persons and 
property from domestic or foreign threats is essential to the operation of markets and the 
incentives to invest and innovate. To the extent that military expenditure increases security it 
may increase output. Adam Smith noted that the first two duties of the state were ‘that of 
protecting the society from the violence and invasion of other independent societies….that 
of protecting, as far as possible, every member of society from the injustice or oppression of 
every member of it’. In many poor countries, war and lack of security are major obstacles to 
development. However, military expenditure may be driven not by security needs but by a 
rent seeking military industrial complex and military expenditures may provoke arms races or 
damaging wars and in such cases there would not be positive security effects. Many of these 
effects are contingent, depending on such things as the degree of utilisation, how the military 
expenditure is financed, the externalities from military spending and the effectiveness of 
military expenditure in countering the threat. These factors are likely to vary over countries 
and over time, with the consequence that the economic effect of military spending will also 
vary. The time horizons of these effects are very different, some are quite short-run others 
very long-run. All these measurements have to be done within the context of a particular 
model. Gleditsch et al. (1996) contains a large number of studies using country specific 
models.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
Since interstate conflict involves at least two parties, it is a dyadic concept. This current 
research involved constructing dyadic proxies for India-Pakistan interstate trade, military 
burden, development expenditure, economic development and democracy to test the five 
hypotheses presented above. Data definitions appear in the appendix.
Measuring conflict
The literature on interstate conflict classifies conflict data sets into two categories: 1) war 
data and 2) events data (Polachek and Seiglie 2006). War data sets focus on the more hostile 
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Bremer and Singer 1996). The most comprehensive war data set is available under the 
Correlates of War Project (COW), which has updated war data sets employed by Wright 
(1942), Richardson (1960), and Singer and Small (1972). The other major data set on 
interstate armed conflict is hosted by the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) with the 
collaboration of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and is collected on 
an annual basis and covers the full post-World War II period, 1946–2003. Events data 
focuses on all interstate events and bilateral interactions reported in newspapers. 
McClelland’s (1978) World Events Interaction Survey (WIES) is probably the first of its kind 
based on bilateral interactions occurring during 1966-1992, reported in The New York Times. 
Azar’s (1980) Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB) is an extensive longitudinal 
collection of about one million daily events reported from 47 newspaper sources between 
1948 and 1978. Since this paper is interested in the evolution of the India-Pakistan conflict 
over the last 55 years, the Uppsala/PRIO and COW interstate war data set will be used 
instead of events-based data sets because the former data sets provide conflict data, which 
covers most of the period of 55 years (1950-2005) selected for this analysis. Events data set 
is not available for the entire period. Although the events data set captures daily 
observations, the macroeconomic and democracy data varies annually, which limits the use 
of daily information on conflict. Hostility between India and Pakistan has been high most of 
the last 55 years, enabling the COW data set to capture the severity of conflict during most 
of the dispute. Greater coverage by the COW and Uppsala data sets, and availability of 
macroeconomic and democracy data on an annual basis limits the scope of using the events 
data sets. 
Six different measures of conflict are carefully compiled by using COW and Uppsala 
datasets:
1. Annual fatality Levels ranging 0-6 (Fatal)
2. Precise number of deaths (Volfatal)
3. Number of days of conflict in a year (Dur)
4.  Highest action in disputes taken by both India and Pakistan (Hiact)
5. Annual hostility level severity (Hstlev)
6. Conflict intensity ranging 0-2 (Cnf)
There are several reasons for the selection of various proxies of conflict. The most 
appropriate proxy and the one which is most closely linked to conflict (or its severity) are 
number of deaths in the battlefield. Not only that, number of death variable has a higher 
level of variation among yearly observations but they are also more random, while subtly 
establishing nature of ongoing conflict which sometimes resulted in outright war. We know 
from Hstlev that hostilities have remained high through out periods of 1950-2007, but it is 
more interesting to know the ground realities of the battle field, where with the exceptions 
of three major wars when battle ground constitutes larger international borders between 
both States, Pakistan and India’s exchange of fire concentrates on the ‘Line of Control’. (See 
high conflict zone maps for India and Pakistan at the end of the chapter)  There are two 
proxies for number of deaths in battle field. One is Volfatal capturing exact number of 
deaths and Fatal which capture annual fatality level to the scale of (0-6). Volfatal (exact 
number of deaths) have ever higher levels of variation among data, where number of deaths 
in three major wars (1965, 1971 and 1999), reached highest thresh-holds of conflict (in 
thousands) with declaration of outright war and thus would appear as out-liars in such 
instances in the long term conflict where number of deaths have remained low (less than a 
7100). In contrast, the variation because of indexation in Fatal becomes more subtle as the 
score would only vary between 0 and 6. 
That makes Fatal a preferred proxy and Volfatal as the second best one. Dur (Days of 
conflict), Hiact (Higest Action in disputes) and Hstlev (Annual Hostility Levels) are also useful 
proxies. They capture the severity of conflict with a different angle. Inclusion of these 
measures in the analysis would help us carry out robustness check for the results on Fatal. 
Larger set of conflict measures would enable us to evaluate the statistical validity of the 
larger model. Furthermore, utilizing more proxies of conflict provides better insight into the 
nature of conflict, especially when causality tests are undertaken. Remember, Causality tests 
would show which measures of conflict (if employed more than one, as in our case) would 
have an effect on our endogenous independent variables (i.e, military burdern, bilateral or 
multilateral trade). 
Measuring international trade
Generally, the sum of imports and exports between actor and target countries captures 
dyadic trade. (Polachek and Seglie 2006) In the last 60 years the patterns of interstate trade 
between Pakistan and India changed. Before trade between both countries collapsed to near 
zero in the early 1970s, Pakistan was exporting more to India. Since the 1970s, Pakistan 
imports more. In the 1950s, Pakistan and India’s trade with each other constituted a 
significant amount of their respective total trade. However, after the 1965 war, India-
Pakistan trade never reached more than two per cent of their respective total trade levels. 
Until the late 1980s, India had been a relatively closed economy, whereas Pakistan has 
traditionally been more open. The researcher constructed two composite measures of India-
Pakistan trade. They are Pakistan’s total trade with India as a percentage of Pakistan’s total 
trade (Tpitp), and India’s trade with Pakistan as a percentage of India’s total trade (Tpiti). The 
expectation is for both trade proxies to relate negatively with conflict. It would be interesting 
to investigate whether trade between both countries as a share of each country’s total trade 
also affects the responsiveness of bilateral trade in conflict mitigation. If trade reduces 
conflict, trade with more countries should reduce conflict even more. (Dorussen 1999) Thus, 
it is important to investigate how more trade with the rest of the world affects India-Pakistan 
hostilities. This research involves eight dyadic proxies to capture the combined international 
integration levels for both countries. Pakistan’s total trade as a ratio of India’s total trade 
(Xmpi), and its inverse, India’s total trade as a ratio of Pakistan’s total trade (Xmip) are the 
first two indicators. If both of these trade proxies relate negatively with hostilities, the clear 
conclusion is that any external trade competition does not increase bilateral rivalry between 
India and Pakistan, but instead both countries have similar trade policies or could integrate 
within regional bodies like SAARC (the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation). 
However, any evidence of a positive relationship between conflict and these two trade 
proxies would suggest that the competition in international markets has significant 
implications in sustaining their rivalry. 
Measuring military expenditure
Military expenditures can reflect hostility, as well as deterrence. (Polachek and Seglie 2006) 
In the India-Pakistan case, it is vital to examine how each county’s military 
expenditure/military burden affects the dispute. Pakistan’s spending on military expenditure 
as a proportion of GDP is higher than India’s. Additionally, since military expenditures may 
also capture the capability of a country to deal with civil unrest or intra-state conflict, the 
high prevalence of continuing intra-state conflicts in various regions of India can also explain 
India’s military expenditures. Pakistan has had fewer civil wars. This may mean that 
8Pakistan’s military burden captures its security concerns vis-à-vis India solely. If so, dyadic 
variables that take the military burden of Pakistan as a ratio of the Indian military burden, 
should affect conflict positively and vice versa. Here are the eight different dyadic proxies of 
military burden utilising data on military expenditures as well as military personnel 
constructed from Correlates of Wars. 
Military expenditures can either reflect aggression or deterrence, as we have posited above.  
We need to examine country specific dynamics of military spending to find out how each 
country’s military expenditure/military burden affects the dispute. We already know that 
Pakistan’s spending on military expenditure as a proportion of GDP is higher than India’s 
(figure 3). Additionally, since military expenditures may also capture the capability of a 
country to deal with civil unrest or intra-state conflict, Indian military expenditure can also 
be explained in terms of the high prevalence of continuing intra-state conflicts in various 
regions of India. Pakistan has had fewer civil wars. This may mean that Pakistan’s military 
burden captures its security concerns principally vis-à-vis India. Thus to go beyond  average 
dyadic investigation of the effect of military burden on conflict, we utilize 2 dynamic proxies 
of military burden which take military expenditure of Pakistan as a ratio of Indian military 
expenditure (Lmilbrd2) and the inverse (Lmilbrd3) in addition to taking average of India and 
Pakistan’s military expenditures (Lmilbrd1). If, as we speculate, Pakistan’s military burden is 
more closely related to conflict than India’s, Lmilbrd2 will have a positive sign and the inverse 
(Lmilbrd3) should have a negative sign, thus showing denominator effects of the inverse. (See 
Notes at the end of the chapter for details) 
1. Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of India’s defence 
expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 1). 
2. Log of India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 2). 
3. Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd 3). 
4. Log of India’s defence expenditure over GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd4). 
5. Log of India’s defence expenditure average over GDP and Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP (Lmilbrd5). 
6. Log of Pakistan and India’s GDP weighted average of defence expenditures 
(Lmilbrd6). The proportion of military personnel to the total population represents 
the extent of militarisation in a society. 
7. Log of Pakistan military personnel over Pakistan’s total population as a ratio of 
India’s military personnel over India’s total population (LMilppi). 
8. Log of India’s military personnel over India’s total population as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
military personnel over Pakistan’s total population (LMilppi). 
Note that the first two proxies are the inverse of each other and expected to reveal the 
relative sensitivity of each country’s military expenditure to conflict. Proxies 3 and 4 are a 
robustness check with military expenditures of each country divided by the combined 
military expenditure score of both countries. If Lmilbrd3 is positively associated with conflict, 
this hypothesis can substitute for Lmilbrd1. If Pakistan’s military expenditure is more closely 
associated with their bilateral conflict and if Indian military expenditure captures the element 
of deterrence, as well as belligerence with other national and international rivals, then the 
combined military expenditures should have lower explanatory value than Pakistan’s military 
expenditure alone but the sign for combined military score should remain positive. This 
paper strives to investigate the average effects of military expenditures by both countries on 
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India-Pakistan rivalry by taking two more proxies of military burden. This is to investigate 
whether military burden has on average a conflict enhancing effect, irrespective of country 
of origin, after analysing its country specific application for deterrence or belligerence.  
Measuring democracy, growth and other variables 
To capture democracy levels for India and Pakistan required use of the Polity IV project 
hosted by The Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). 
Polity IV computes a combined polity score by subtracting autocracy scores from democracy 
scores for the corresponding year. The value of this Polity score ranges from -10 to 10, 
where -10 denotes the highest autocracy level, and 10 denotes the maximum democracy 
score. Although India always takes a high positive value of seven or above, Pakistan 
frequently takes on negative values. The next step involved constructing a dyadic variable of 
democracy for both countries by multiplying their Polity scores, following Polachek and 
Seiglie (2006), adding 10 to each country’s polity series to make the negative polity values 
positive so that the combined democracy score captures the variations in the 
democratisation process only on a positive scale. The dyadic democracy variable shows 
values as low as 50 on the scale of 0 to 400 when there are high levels of political 
dissimilarities between Pakistan (dictatorship) and India (democracy), and as high as 350 
when both countries are governed by democracies (see figure 2). 
The weighted average of India and Pakistan’s real GDP per capita growth rates (Gpi) 
represents the dyadic proxy of economic progress for both countries. Constructing the series 
for both countries involved taking GDP at constant prices (taken from economic surveys) 
and dividing it by population levels. The researcher tallied the data using the GDP per capita 
series available in the World Development Indicators (2006) data set. The four different 
proxies of social development based on India and Pakistan’s education data1 are, GDP 
weighted average of per capita education expenditure; mean average of per-capita education 
expenditure; Pakistan and India’s education expenditures as a ratio of Pakistan and Indian’s 
GDP; and the average of Pakistan’s education expenditure as a percentage of its GDP and 
India’s education expenditure as a percentage of its GDP. Note that the first two proxies 
employ per-capita education expenditure and the last two proxies employ total education 
expenditure. The purpose of the four education proxies is to perform a robustness check on 
the role of education in conflict mitigation. India and Pakistan are two of the most densely 
populated countries in the world. Pakistan has 160 million inhabitants, and India has more 
than one billion. In line with earlier literature, this thesis also uses the mean average of both 
countries populations as a standardising variable in the analysis. (see Polachek 1997)
Figure 1 Dyadic democracy scores for Pakistan and India
1 There is an insufficiently long time-series for public health spending data for India. 
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3.2. Methodology
Any simple least square regression analysis may lead to spurious results because of 
endogeneity problems among the variables (from trade, military spending, social sector 
expenditure and growth to conflict and vice-versa). It seems necessary to utilise a 
simultaneous equation model to address potential endogeneity problems between various 
variables. Since the data is a time-series, it is appropriate to use Vector Autoregressive model 
(VAR), which is an extension of univariate Autoregressive (AR) models to capture the 
evolution and the interdependencies between multiple time-series. (Sims 1980) Treat all 
variables in a VAR symmetrically by including an equation for each variable explaining its 
evolution based on its own lags and the lags of other variables in the model. The number of 
equations in a VAR model depends upon the number of endogenous variables; each 
endogenous variable is regressed on its lagged value, and the lagged values of all other 
endogenous variables as well as any number of exogenous variables. This solves the problem 
of endogeneity among variables. In this sense, VAR model is a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) model with lagged variables and/or deterministic terms as common 
regressors so that one can interpret the regression results for each equation as ordinary least 
square estimators. 
The basic lag vector autoregressive (VAR ) model has the formp )( p
(1)tptpttt yyycY   ......2211
where is a vector of constants (intercept), is a matrix (for every c )1( n i )( nn 
) and is a vector of error terms.pi ,....,1 t )1( n
A bivariate VAR(2) can be written as the following system of equations:
(2)tttttt yyyycy 12,2
2
2,12,1
2
1,11,2
1
2,11,1
1
1,111  
(3)tttttt yyyycy 22,2
2
2,22,1
2
1,21,2
1
2,21,1
1
1,222  
The lag length has to be determined by model selection criterion (MSC) because too p
many lagged terms will consume more degrees of freedom and may introduce the problem 
of multicollinearity. Introducing too few lags will lead to specification errors. One way of 
deciding this question is to use Akaike (AIC), Schwarz-Bayesian (BIC) or Hannan Quinn 
(HQ) criteria and choose the model that gives the lowest values of these criteria. AIC 
criterion asymptotically overestimates the order with positive probability, whereas BIC and 
HQ criterion estimate the order consistently under general conditions if the true order is p
less than or equal to .maxp
After fitting a VAR, it may be important to know which way causalities run. One way to 
do that is by running Granger causality tests after the VAR analysis. In a bivariate VAR 
model, a variable  is said to Granger-cause a variable  if, given the past values of , 2y 1y 1y
past values of are useful for predicting  (Granger 1969). Similarly it is feasible to 2y 1y
extend the current analysis to test Granger-causality for multivariate VAR ( ), wherep
. ),......,,( 21  ntttt yyyY
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4. Results with VAR models 
This section reports the results of the multivariate VAR regression analysis. As we can see, 
the data set is purely time series, which may mean that most of the variables may simply only 
follow a random walk. Generally that is the case with most time series. (See detailed Notes at 
the end of the paper)  If a regression employs non-stationary or a mix of stationary and non-
stationary variables, the error term would suffer from autocorrelation which would in turn 
mean that the error term obtained from such a regression would also be non-stationary. 
Generally, non-stationarity in variables may be solved by taking first difference of the series. 
However, it is not necessary to always take first differences, and stationary may be achieved 
at levels by taking time lags of variables where time trends or random walks would not be 
observed anymore.  
Figure 2. Pakistan and India’s Dyadic Growth Rates
As we have taken dyadic proxies, the problem of random walk may be minimised and we 
may obtain stationarity for our variables at levels rather than first differences. Table 6.2 
undertakes unit root analysis to test for stationarity in the dyadic variables under the 
modified or augmented  Dickey-Fuller t test (DF-GLS) proposed by Elliot, Rothenberg & 
Stock (1996), where each series is transformed via a generalised least squares (GLS) 
regression before performing the test. The results show that we could effectively solve for 
unit-roots (random walk) at levels, although for some variables we only obtain stationarity 
after quite a number of lags. In case of Tpitp, taking lags up to 15 periods solves for the 
random walk. By contrast, the economic development variable capturing the dyadic growth 
rates for India and Pakistan (Gpi) has been observed to be a perfectly stationary series (figure 
1). Unit-root test confirms this observation; stationarity is achieved at levels with 0 lags.
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Table1. DF-GLS unit root tests
Variables Lag With intercept
With intercept and 
trend
Fatal (annual fatality levels, 0-6) 1 -3.528*** (Ng-Perron)
-3.774*** (Ng-
Perron)
Volfatal (precise numbers) 1 -4.789* **(Ng-Perron)
-4.844*** (Ng-
Perron)
Dur (days of conflict) 1 -4.058* **(Ng-Perron)
-4.233***(Ng-
Perron)
Hiact (highest action in disputes) 1 -2.382** (Ng-Perron) -2.590 (Ng-Perron)
Hstlev (annual hostility levels, 1-5) 1 -2.371** (Ng-Perron) -2.512  (Ng-Perron)
Cnf (conflict intensity ranges given by the PRIO-Uppsala data set) 1 -3.025* **(Ng-Perron)
-4.082***  (Ng-
Perron)
Tpitp (Pakistan-India bilateral trade as a proportion of Pakistan’s 
trade) 15
-1.112* (Ng-
Perron) -1.861  (Ng-Perron)
Tpiti (Above as a proportion of Indian trade) 15 -3.856***  (MAIC) -3.319** (Ng-Perron)
Xmpi (Pakistan’s total global trade as a ratio of India’s global trade) 2 -2.710*** (Ng-Perron)
-2.860* (Ng-
Perron)
Xmip (inverse of the above) 8 -4.951***  (MAIC) -4.923***   (MAIC)
Lxpi1 (Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s total 
exports) 0 2.951** (D-Fuller) 2.951**  (D-Fuller)
Lxpi2 (Log mean of Pakistan’s total exports over Pakistan’s GDP and 
India’s total exports over India’s GDP) 0 -4.769*** (SIC) -4.929*** (SIC)
Lmpi1 (Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s total 
imports) 1 -4.049*** (SIC) -3.961*** (SIC)
Lmpi2 (Log mean of Pakistan’s total imports as a proportion of 
Pakistan’s GDP and India’s total imports as a ratio of India’s GDP) 1 -4.511*** (SIC) -4.382*** (SIC)
Lmilbrd1 (Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s 
GDP as a ratio of India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP) 5
-2.209** (Ng-
Perron)
-2.795* (Ng-
Perron)
Lmilbrd2 (Inverse of the above) 5 -2.209**(Ng-Perron) -2.795*(Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd3 (Log of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s 
GDP as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s 
GDP plus India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP)
5 -1.911*(Ng-Perron) -2.686*(Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd4 (Log of India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP as a 
ratio of Pakistan’s defence expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP plus 
India’s defence expenditure over India’s GDP)
5 -2.128*(Ng-Perron) -2.831*(Ng-Perron)
Lmilbrd5 (Log of Mean of India’s defence expenditure over GDP 
and Pakistan’s defence expenditure over GDP) 1 -4.735*** (SIC) -4.748*** (SIC)
Lmilbrd6 (Log GDP weighted average of Pakistan and India’s 
defence expenditures) 0 - -4.308*** (SIC)
Lmilppi (Log of Pakistan’s military personnel over Pakistan’s total 
population as a ratio of India’s military personnel over India’s total 
population)
1 -4.082*** (SIC) -4.098*** (SIC)
Lmilpip (inverse of the above) 1 -4.082*** (SIC) -4.098*** (SIC)
Ledupi1 (log GDP weighted average of per capita education 
expenditure in India and Pakistan) 1 - -5.374*** (SIC)
Ledupi2 (log mean of per capita education expenditure in India and 
Pakistan) 1 - -5.478*** (SIC)
Ledupi3 (log of Pakistan and India’s education expenditures as a ratio 
of both GDPs) 1 -5.918*** (SIC) -5.907*** (SIC)
Ledupi4 (log of average of Pakistan’s education expenditure over 
GDP plus India’s education expenditure over GDP) 1 - -5.642*** (SIC)
Gpi (weighted average of GDP per capita growth rates for both 
countries) 0
-4.256*** (Ng-
Perron)
-4.276*** (Ng-
Perron)
Demopi (combined democracy scores) 7 -2.790*** (Ng-Perron)
-2.997*** (Ng-
Perron)
Poppi (average of total populations) 10 - -7.392*** (MAIC)
-***, ** and *shows significance at 1%, 5%and 10% level
-  The Lag structure is selected through (1) Ng-Perron sequential t (Ng-Perron), (2) the minimum Schwarz 
information criterion (SIC), (3) the Ng-Perron modified information criterion (MAIC) and (4) Dickey-Fuller 
test (D-Fuller). 
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Proxies treated as endogenous variables include those for conflict, bilateral and multilateral 
trade, economic progress, military burden and social development; whereas the concepts 
treated as purely exogenous are dyadic democracy and population. Since, these time-series 
variables are stationary at levels, although with some time lags, this allows the use of 
unrestricted VAR analysis instead of restricted VECM methodology. It is now possible to 
proceed to VAR analysis. The reduced form VAR model for conflict is as follows
 (4)tttititititititititititt PDemoGEMilTrConfConf   87,6,5,4,3,21 
Where , , , , , and depict interstate conflict, bilateral or tConf itTr  itMil  itE  itG  tDemo tP
multilateral trade, military burden, education expenditure, real growth rate of GDP per-
capita, dyadic democracy score and population respectively; t ranges from 1950-2007 and 
. Here is the optimal lag structure for the VAR model. pi ,....,1 p it,2 it,3 it,4 it,5
and are metrics (for every ).it,6 )66(  pi ,....,1
Running the above model for the number of fatalities (Fatal), best captures the severity 
of the militarised conflict between the two nations. Later analysis employs other conflict 
proxies. 
Table 2 shows the results for bilateral trade with the eight proxies of military burden 
proposed. The evidence suggests that trade between Pakistan and India significantly 
decreases hostilities between both nations. However, the low values of coefficients it,3
suggest that bilateral trade has a limited role to play in conflict mitigation. This is not 
surprising because trade between Pakistan and India remained very low, and comprises only 
a small fraction of each country’s total international trade. Although low trade levels between 
both countries may very well be the cause of the ongoing conflict, the current analysis does 
not need to be concerned with reverse causality because the VAR model takes care of 
potential endogeneity problems between Fatal and Tpitp or Tpiti. On the other hand, 
Lmilbrd1, Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3, Lmilbrd4, Lmilbrd5 and Lmilbrd6 all relate significantly with 
conflict, especially in the case of Tpitp. Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd3 relate negatively with conflict, 
and Lmilbrd2 and Lmilbrd4 positively relate with conflict. This confirms the hypothesis that 
Pakistan’s high military expenditure is a close determinant of the India-Pakistan conflict. 
The high values of the coefficients in this case indicate that any increase in military it,4
expenditure by Pakistan when compared to India correlates with higher conflict. However 
negative signs of Lmilbrd2 and Lmilbrd4 also suggest that India’s military expenditure is 
weakly related to conflict whereas as Indian military expenditure is also directed at its 
domestic civil wars and security concerns with other states and thus in the case of Lmilbrd1, 
Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3 and Lmilbrd4 the explanatory power comes from Pakistan’s military 
expenditure. Furthermore, combined military scores in Lmilbrd5 and Lmilbrd5 relate 
positively with conflict and the relationship is significant for both proxies of bilateral trade. 
This result suggests that irrespective of Indian security concerns national or international, or 
Pakistan’s anxieties about Indian hegemony, military expenditures on average do not have 
deterrent effect (in terms of fewer fatalities), but high military expenditures by both sides 
show some evidence of an arms race. The insignificance of Lmilppi and Lmilpip may also 
indicate the transformation of contemporary conventional war tactics, in which military size 
per se has a limited role in providing strategic depth. However the negative sign of Lmilppi 
and the positive sign of Lmilpip hints that higher militarisation in Pakistan may very well be 
an outcome of the ongoing hostilities between the two nations, as higher Pakistani military 
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personnel has a deterrent effect, and the converse is true for India. Education expenditures 
Ledupi1 and growth rates Gpi relate significantly to conflict mitigation, and the size of 
coefficients suggests that the potential for spending on education in decreasing hostilities is 
quite substantial. Democracy also decreases the severity of conflict, but the low values of 
coefficients show the relationship is quite weak. 
Table 3 present results for multilateral trade with various proxies of military burden. In 
combination with various proxies of multilateral trade, the explanatory power of Lmilbrd1, 
Lmilbrd2, Lmilbrd3 and Lmilbrd4 reduced, as they are generally insignificant, but the 
coefficients also reduce, especially for Xmpi and Xmip. The only military burden proxy that is 
consistently significant and comes out with the right sign is Lmilbrd6. This means that the 
present conclusion about the average conflict-enhancing role of military expenditures 
remains unaltered. Results in Table 3 also show that Xmpi is generally insignificant, whereas 
Xmip is significant in nearly all specifications. This is an interesting result, which suggests 
that higher Indian levels of trade integration mitigate conflict more than when Pakistani 
openness rises. However, the negative signs for both proxies confirm that greater openness 
in either country would significantly decrease conflict. Furthermore, it is reasonable to 
conclude that there is no rivalry between India and Pakistan in terms of their trade with the 
rest of the world, and any competition to capture international market share is healthy. Table 
6.3C shows results for average trade scores for both countries differentiated by exports and 
imports. Exports by both countries to the rest of the world relate negatively with conflict 
and the relationship is significant at the one per cent level. Also, note that the values of  it,3
increased further for combined exports when compared with the results in Table 2, 
indicating that the more these two countries are able to export to the rest of the world, the 
lower the levels of bilateral conflict. The high coefficients of Xmpi can lead the inference that 
the explanatory power for Xpi comes more from the Indian side. Both countries are at 
similar rungs on the technological ladder and share the potential to export to the rest of the 
world, along with countries like China. In contrast to exports, results on Lmpi1 and Lmpi2 
show that rising imports do not increase hostilities, as the signs are always negative but the 
overall insignificance of combined import scores mean imports may not exert any negative 
pressure on hostilities either. The results for education expenditure, economic performance 
and democracy remain unchanged. 
Table 2  VAR regression equations for fatal under multiple specifications of bilateral trade and military burden
Left Hand Side Variable : FatalRight Hand Side
Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Bilateral Trade
Tpitp (16) -0.30*** -0.30*** -0.32*** -0..28*** -0.24** -0.23** -0.22**
Tpiti (16) -0.76* -0.76* -0.83** -0.70* -0.61* -0.64* 0.55*
Military Burdeñ̃̃̃̃̃
lmilbrd1 (6) 2.33* 2.02
lmilbrd2 (6) -2.33* -2.02
lmilbrd3 (6) 6.53* 6.03
lmilbrd4 (6) -3.45 -2.84
lmilbrd5 (2) 6.84** 6.54**
lmilbrd6 (1) 3.26* 3.52*
Lmilppi(2) -1.80
Lmilpip(2) 1.79
Social 
Development
Ledupi1(2) -4.98 -4.98 -4.83 -5.9* -6.35** -8.34*** -6.08** -6.7* -6.7* -6.9* -6.2* -5.9** -8.35*** -6.10**
Economic 
Growth
Gpi (1) -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.28*** -0.35*** -0.34*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.39*** -0.31*** -0.38*** -0.37***
Exogenous 
Variables
Demopi (7) -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004* -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003* -0.004*
Poppi (10) 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.066*** 0.112*** 0.094*** 0.076*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.101*** 0.088*** 0.07***
N 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 38
R2 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.57
VAR(p) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2) VAR(2)
                                    -***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
                                      - VAR (p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) 
                                          and the Hannan and  Quinn information criterion (HQIC),
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Table 3 VAR regression equations for fatal under multiple specifications of multilateral trade and military burden
 Left Hand Side Variable : Fatal
Right Hand Side
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
Mutilateral Trade
Xmpi(3) -0.71 -0.71 -0.75 -0.74 -0.62 -0.77* -0.75*
Xmip(9) -3.74*** -3.74*** -3.77*** -3.74*** -3.89*** -2.68*** -3.83***
Military Burdeñ̃̃̃̃̃    
lmilbrd1 (6) 0.08 -0.18
lmilbrd2 (6) -0.08 0.18
lmilbrd3 (6) 0.91 0.27
lmilbrd4 (6) -0.58 0.50
lmilbrd5 (2) 0.04 -0.49
lmilbrd6 (1) 3.38** 2.26*
Lmilppi(2) -1.02
Lmilpip(2) 0.92
Social Development
Ledupi1(2) -3.64*** -3.64*** -3.59*** -3.69*** -3.60*** -8.07*** -2.85*** -4.73*** -4.73*** -4.67*** -4.79*** -4.44** -7.70*** -4.22***
Economic Growth
Gpi (1) -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.37*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.36*** -0.39***
Exogenous Variables
Demopi (7) -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005***
Poppi (10) 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.094*** 0.062*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.082*** 0.084*** 0.078*** 0.101*** 0.075***
N 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
R2 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.47 0.46
VAR(p) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1) VAR(1)
                                       -***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level
                                      - VAR (p) reports lag-order for each VAR model based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) 
                                          and the Hannan and  Quinn information criterion (HQIC),
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It would be interesting to run multivariate Granger causality tests to see if causality runs from 
the determinants of conflict-to-conflict, and whether there are cases of reverse causality. This 
research included Granger causality tests for each VAR specification, presented in Tables 2 and 3. 
Table 4 provides a summary of Granger causality tests for all endogenous regressors of conflict, and 
where there is an instance of reverse causality, it is noted. The results in Table 4 show that all 
regressors except Lmilppi, Lmilpip, Lmpi1 and Lmpi2 Granger cause conflict. There were also 
observations of some instances of reverse causality, especially for Tpitp, Tpiti, Lmilbrd5, Lmilbrd6, 
Ledpi1, Ledupi2 and Ledupi4 in case of Fatal, Lmilbrd6 in case of Volfatal, lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case 
of Cnfpi, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of Dur, Lxpi2, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of Hstlvl and 
Lxpi2, Lmilbrd6 and Ledupi1 in case of Hiact. 
Table 4 Granger causality Wald tests
Direction of Causality Causes RC Direction of Causality Causes RC
FatalTpitp  (√)*** (√)* VolfatalGpi  (√)*** ×
FatalTpiti  (√)* (√)** CnfpiLxpi 2 (√)*** ×
FatalXmpi  (√)** × CnfpiLmilbrd 3 (√)*** ×
FatalXmip  (√)*** × CnfpiLmilbrd 4 (√)*** ×
FatalLxpi 1 (√)*** × CnfpiLmilbrd 6 × (√)*
FatalLxpi 2 (√)*** × CnfpiLedupi 1 (√)* (√)*
FatalLmpi 1 × × CnfpiGpi  (√)*** ×
FatalLmpi 2  × × DurLxpi 2 (√)*** ×
FatalLmilbrd 1 (√)** × DurLmilbrd 3 (√)*** ×
FatalLmilbrd 2 (√)** × DurLmilbrd 4 (√)** ×
FatalLmilbrd 3 (√)*** × DurLmilbrd 6 × (√)*
FatalLmilbrd 4 (√)*** × DurLedupi 1 (√)*** (√)***
FatalLmilbrd 5 (√)*** (√)** DurGpi  (√)*** ×
FatalLmilbrd 6 (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLxpi 2 (√)*** (√)*
FatalLmilpip  × × HstlvlLmilbrd 3 (√)** ×
FatalLmilppi  × × HstlvlLmilbrd 4 (√)* ×
FatalLedupi 1 (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLmilbrd 6 × (√)***
FatalLedupi 2 (√)*** (√)*** HstlvlLedupi 1 × (√)***
FatalLedupi 3 (√)*** × HstlvlGpi  (√)* ×
FatalLedupi 4 (√)*** (√)* HiactLxpi 2 (√)** (√)*
FatalGpi  (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd 3 × ×
VolfatalLxpi 2 (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd 4 × ×
VolfatalLmilbrd 3 (√)*** × HiactLmilbrd 6 × (√)***
VolfatalLmilbrd 4 (√)*** × HiactLedupi 1 (√)* (√)**
VolfatalLmilbrd 6 (√)*** (√)* HiactGpi  (√)* ×
VolfatalLedupi 1 (√)*** ×
***, **, * shows significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, RC stands for reverse causation, √ means causes and × means not causes
The reverse causality in the India-Pakistan bilateral trade measures show that low levels of trade 
are also an outcome of the India-Pakistan conflict, which has spanned more than 50 years. Any 
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decrease in hostility levels would also exert a positive and favourable effect on bilateral trade, which 
would create fertile ground for dispute resolution. Thus, more bilateral trade through reduction of 
tariffs is a noteworthy confidence building measure. The presence of reverse causality in average 
military spending is also not a surprise. This means that the India-Pakistan conflict is a significant 
cause of historically high military expenditures between both countries. Especially if high levels of 
conflict between India and Pakistan lower India’s military expenditure as a proportion of Pakistan’s 
military expenditure, then Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd3 would relate positively with conflict, which is the 
case in Tables 2. In light of the results, one interpretation may be that a military build-up by Pakistan 
increases as a response to conflict. This may be true because the dominant role of the army and high 
military expenditures in Pakistan are justified due to continuous high levels of hostility with its 
neighbour. Otherwise, Pakistan does not have any major dispute with any other nation, or frequent 
instances of intra-state disputes to justify the high budget allocation for defence. Reduction of 
hostilities would thus favourably affect the military burden in both countries, and both India and 
Pakistan could have more resources to channel towards its development and poverty reduction 
strategies. The reverse causality from conflict to education expenditure could explain this process. 
Reverse causality between conflict measures and proxies of education expenditure highlight the 
resource constraints faced by both sides due to their rivalry where funds allocated to defence seem 
to crowd out public investment in the development sector. Also found is reverse causality between 
Lxpi2, Hstslvl and Hiact. This result highlights the economic implication of conflict. If hostility levels 
rise and conflict moves closer to outright war, it will strangle export capability with the rest of the 
world for both countries. This will have negative effects on growth potential as well. For example, 
right after the 1971 and 1999 wars between Pakistan and India, total trade shares for both countries 
witnessed a deep decline. Economic growth Granger causes conflict and the relationship is negative. 
The growth patterns of both countries are independent of conflict, as far as reverse causality is 
concerned. The relationship is highly significant at a one per cent level in all the observed instances 
of Table 4. Any slowdown in growth rates in either of the two nations seems to correlate positively 
with conflict and this trend has been present since 1950. 
5. Conclusions:
Previous studies on the subject have measured conflict between both countries through their 
military expenditures. Such studies have put the blame on Pakistan for rising hostilities between two 
countries as Pakistan’ military budget as a proportion to GDP is much higher than that of India. 
However analysis in this paper refutes such claims. As per the practice in defence literature, this 
paper considers military expenditures as strategic assets and they are interacted with real proxies of 
conflict such as hostile actions and threats of using force by India or Pakistan and fatalities caused 
by cross border military actions. The study finds that Pakistan’s military expenditures always rise 
when fatalities of the conflict rise. But the rising military expenditures in Pakistan in return cause a 
fall in the threat level of a possible hostile action from Indian side resulting in ex post fall in 
fatalities. Eventually, the rise in military expenditures in Pakistan in response to rise in military 
expenditures in India is good for peace between both countries as the former create significant 
deterrence against the possibility of hostile actions from Indian side. 
The author also extends the analysis to capture political and economic linkages of the conflict. Note 
that the time period utilized in the study is from 1950-2007, thus capturing the historic dynamics of 
conflict as well as more contemporary economic explanations to it. The study finds that economic 
development abates the possibility of conflict and brings both countries closer to peace.  However 
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there is also evidence of economic competition. If Pakistan is able to export more to the outside 
world, hostility would rise from the Indian side. The converse is not true. Pakistan is again a peaceful 
nation when comes to trade competition. The evidence in this regards comes in 2002, when India 
tried to restrict Pakistan’s trading capabilities by unilaterally amassing troops in Pakistani borders. 
2002 is the year when Pakistan started to witness an economic come back from the economic 
crunch of the 1990s. Later in 2007 Pakistan also lost GSP+ arrangement in EU on an Indian 
complain to WTO.  GSP+ provided Pakistan increased market access to EU for its products. Ever 
since GSP + was taken away, Pakistan’s market shares in EU have been declining.
Though military expenditures and economic development have been found to play a vital role in 
promotion of peace between India and Pakistan through deterrence effect, democracy in Pakistan 
also abates hostilities. Another important finding of the paper is that rise in education expenditures 
would bring both countries closer to the practice of real democracy and increase the possibility of 
peaceful solution to bilateral issues.  Here comes the paradox highlighted by the paper that high 
military expenditures squeeze education budgets in Pakistan and India, thus limiting the possibility 
of peace. In an ideal scenario, Pakistan and India should both curtail military budgets by focusing 
more on peace than conflict.
6. Notes on Empirical Results
6.1. Granger Causality and Military Burden 
Table 4 high-lights the country specific dynamics of military burden in India and Pakistan and nature of 
conflict. For example, if conflict lasts for more days, or hostilities rise or severity of action (i.e., in extreme 
case of out right war) rise between both parties, all would have a significant and positive shock on military 
expenditures in India and Pakistan as there is a presence of reverse causality between Lmilbrd6 and these 
measure of conflict but no presence of causality. No presence of causality means that arms race between 
India and Pakistan (Lmilbrd6) would not lead to rise in hostilities, neither increase the yearly duration of the 
conflict or lead to highest action (out-right war). This is an important result suggesting that higher military 
expenditures by both sides also have a deterrent effect on conflict, but if fatalities in the conflict rise, it will 
put a positive pressure on other measures of conflict, which in turn have positive shock on the arms race 
because we also find in table 4 that Lmilbrd6, in presence of reverse causation, appears to also positively and 
significantly cause Fatal or Volfatal. In contrast, Lmildbrd1, Lmildbrd2, Lmildbrd3and Lmilbrd4, which are 
dynamic interactions of Indian and Pakistani military expenditures, significantly cause conflict while there is 
no reverse causation. This points out towards the prevalent mistrust between both parties and the reason 
behind the arms race, where Pakistan’s military expenditure is more sensitively related with conflict than the 
Indian military expenditure. Though, Pakistan may see its rise in military expenditure as deterrence to match 
Indian military expenditure, it would in effect has a positive effect on conflict as it would sustain hostilities 
between both parties at not only higher levels of severity but also the duration of the conflict on average 
would rise. Furthermore, Hiact (highest action in conflict) is not affected by military expenditures as all 
measures of military burden do not cause Hiact, though in case of Milbrd1, highest action in conflict 
positively influence the former suggesting that outright wars or increase in the severity of action would put 
upward pressure on the military expenditures of Pakistan and India much equally. In case of war, one may 
explain this relationship by simply suggesting that Pakistan and India spend more resources on military 
procurement to cover such depleted military assets which have been increasingly utilized in the conflict. 
6.2. Taking Inverse Ratios: “What They Really Show for Military Burden and Trade?”
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The nature of variables is dyadic, corresponding to the analysis which is so common in conflict studies which 
investigate conflict in dyadic settings. However, defence or trade or democracy would provide results which 
may only capture dyadic effects while may not reveal some very important country specific information. For 
example, high military expenditure is conflict enhancing and higher bilateral or multilateral trade is conflict 
reducing. Such assertions may be substantiated by theory or empirics but it may suffer from one limitation: if 
the dyadic variables are constructed in a fashion that they only capture average effects of the two parties 
involved, (e.g. Lmilbrd6) results may be misleading as in reality, one party may be more relevant than other or 
the two parties may work in opposite directions.
For example, in our case, Pakistan’s military expenditure is seen as conflict enhancing especially by Indian 
side. However, Pakistan sees military expenditure as a deterrence from outside (i.e., Indian) aggression 
suggesting that actually Indian military expenditure is fuelling the conflict. Indian, in contrast, traditionally see 
its high military expenditure as a deterrence to not only outside aggression but also inside civil unrest, 
whereby India has a high concentration of its military resources in the region of Kashmir. In the conflict 
literature, military expenditures are assets, which represent national capabilities to not only deter international 
conflict but also curtail any such civil unrest which may be a risk for economic development at national level. 
Thus relationship between military expenditures and conflict is not a linear one but a very dynamic one. Even 
if our dyadic proxy of military expenditure, which may take an average of India and Pakistan’s military 
expenditure, has a positive relationship with Conflict between two nations, we cannot say with certainty 
whether such empirical finding may lead to the conclusion that Military expenditures are conflict enhancing. 
It may be that Pakistani military spending is conflict enhancing and Indian military spending show an effect 
of deterrence (which means conflict reducing). Or it may be the opposite case. Another scenario may be that 
high military expenditure in India may show rivalry with a third party (China, a case in point) and thus may 
not be relevant at all in our analysis, while Pakistan may indeed be addressing its concerns viz-a-viz Indian 
hegemony and spend high on military build-up as a matter of deterrence. 
Please note that it is to our discretion to put Pakistan or India as a numerator or denominator. Changing 
the position may have implications due to case sensitivities (as we would find in case of Lmilbrd1 and 
Lmilbrd2). For example Lmilbrd 1, where India is in the denominator, has a positive sign suggesting Lmilbrd1 is 
conflict enhancing. However, Lmilbrd 2, where Pakistan is in the denominator, has a negative relationship 
with conflict, suggesting on its face value that Lmilbrd2 is conflict reducing. Both results are conflicting. 
According to our hypothesis, military burden for India and Pakistan, both should be conflict enhancing. That 
we do find for Lmilbrd6, which is just average of both. Hence, in the light of Lmilbrd6 and its relationship with 
conflict, the signs of Lmilbrd1 and Lmilbrd2 actually give away important information, which is about relative 
importance of India and Pakistan’s military expenditure in the conflict. If conflict is more related with 
Pakistani military expenditure then in case Pakistan military expenditure goes into the denominator, the sign 
should change and it does change in our regression models quite consistently satisfying maximum number of 
robustness checks. In the light of these results, a positive sign of Lmilbrd6 suggests that Indian military 
expenditure also enhance conflict, but it is less relevant than the Pakistani one to explain severity of conflict 
between both nations. 
In multilateral trade, inverse specifications serve this very analysis to investigate dyadic as well as country 
specific relationship to understand the dynamics of India-Pakistan conflict not only with its evolutionary 
settings but also with country specific perspective as to how trade may be related with conflict and thus 
suggest a peace strategy in rather comprehensive manner. For example, a higher coefficient of Xmip when 
compared to Xmpi shows that any rise in Indian trade with rest of the world has a proportionally greater 
effect on conflict mitigation than a rise in Pakistan’s trade with rest of the world. Economic integration by 
Indian side would decrease costs of peace for India at a much greater pace than if Pakistan integrates with 
rest of the world. Our theoretical model has covered such dynamic trade-offs for India and Pakistan. In 
undertaking such empirical methodology (not to mention the utilization of VAR), chapter 6 confirms or 
rejects many assertions which are put forward in academic as well as popular literature to explain India-
Pakistan conflict. 
21
6.3. Why Granger Causality through a VAR?
Since there is endogeniety problem between variables of interest, VAR can analyze the nature of relationship 
without assuming dependency of one variable over the other. Only granger causality tests, which follow VAR 
analysis, inform us about the direction of relationship and it may be the case, as we found in our analysis, the 
direction of relationship between a pair of variables is two way. This again is important information. Thus the 
purpose is to investigate nature (+ or -) of relationship between conflict variables and other endogenous 
independent variables (military burden, bilateral or multilateral trade, economic development etc), while also 
examining the direction of relationship. VAR provides one of the best time series methodologies. However, 
first we have to solve for random walk or trends in our time series variables. Since our variables of choice are 
dyadic in nature, we could solve for random walk at level instead of first difference.
As we can see, the data set is purely time series which may mean that most of the variables may suffer 
from random walk. Generally that is the case with most time series. If a regression employs non stationary or 
a mix of stationary and non-stationary variables, the error term would suffer from autocorrelation which 
would in turn mean that the error term obtained from such a regression would also be non stationary. 
Generally, non-stationarity in variables may be solved by taking first difference of the series. It is not 
necessary to always take first difference and stationary may be achieved at level by taking time lags of 
variables where time trends or random walk would not be observed anymore: 
1. Stationary Time Series (Basic Characteristics): 
(a) Mean reverting around a constant long-run mean
(b) Constant variance which time-invariant
2. Non Stationary Time Series (Basic Characteristics)
(a) Has no long-run into which the series returns
(b) The variance depends on time and approached infinity as time goes to infinity
(A) Types of Non Stationarity
1. The random walk model with drift:
yt =  + yt-1 + ut  (6.19)
2. The deterministic trend process:
yt =  + t + ut  (6.20)
3. The explosive process:
yt =  + yt-1 + ut (6.21)
where  > 1. Typically, the explosive case is ignored and we use  = 1 to characterise the non-stationarity 
because: 
(a)  > 1 does not describe many data series in economics and finance.
(b)  > 1 has an intuitively unappealing property: shocks to the system are not only persistent through 
time, they are propagated so that a given shock will have an increasingly large influence. 
(B) The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test
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Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Fuller (1976) developed the basic test for unit roots and order of integration. 
The basic objective of the test is to test the null hypothesis that  =1 in: yt = yt-1 + ut against the one-
sided alternative  <1. 
So we have 
H0: series contains a unit root 
Vs. H1: series is stationary. 
Figure 6.7 
Properties of Times Series
Plot of a stationary series Plot of Random Walk Series
We usually use the more convenient regression:
yt = γyt-1 + ut 
so that a test of =1 is equivalent to a test of γ=0 (since -1=γ).
yt = yt-1 + ut , yt- yt-1 = yt-1 - yt-1 + ut, yt = (-1)yt-1 + ut
Dickey and Fuller proposed three tests. The null (H0) and alternative (H1) models in each case are
i) H0: yt = yt-1+ut H1: yt = yt-1+ut, <1
This is a test for a random walk against a stationary autoregressive process of order one (AR(1))
ii) H0: yt = yt-1+ut H1: yt = yt-1++ut, <1
This is a test for a random walk against a stationary AR (1) with drift.
iii) H0: yt = yt-1+ut H1: yt = yt-1++t+ut, <1
This is a test for a random walk against a stationary AR (1) with drift and a time trend.
The three models can be described as cases with:
i) No intercept, no trend
ii) Intercept, no trend
iii) Intercept and trend
As the error term is unlikely to be white noise Dickey and Fuller extended their procedure suggesting an 
“augmented” version that uses p lags of the dependent variable
As the error term is unlikely to be white noise Dickey and Fuller extended their procedure suggesting an 
“augmented” version that uses p lags of the dependent variable. The alternative model in case (i) is now 
written:
A problem now arises in determining the optimal number of lags of the dependent variable. 
There are 2 ways
- use the frequency of the data to decide
- use information criteria 
In our case, we have taken dyadic proxies, and thus the problem of random walk may have been 
minimised and we may obtain stationarity for our variables at level rather than first differences.
6.4. Fatalities and Trade Relationship
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fatal What would be the impact of a 100 percent increase in bilateral trade or 
multilateral trade on Conflict (fatalities)? For example, the coefficients 
in table 2 and 3 suggest if bilateral trade or multilateral trade doubles, 
fatalities (Fatal) would witness a decrease of at least 2 points or 200 
percent in case of multilateral trade and only 20 percent (less than a half 
point) in case of bilateral trade. This means if Fatal have scored 5, and 
trade with rest of the world doubles, Fatal will go down to score 3. 
Generally, Fatal has taken up score of 3 or 2, which means usually battle 
deaths have been either 26-100 deaths in case of score 2 or 101-250 deaths in case of score 3. With high 
coefficients of multilateral trade in reducing fatal, one may confer that multilateral trade (relationship with 
outside world) traditionally have been playing a key role to contain fatalities and also possibility of out right 
war between India and Pakistan. In contrast, bilateral trade has much smaller effect in containing fatalities and 
thus plays a very limited role in conflict mitigation between India and Pakistan. 
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Appendix1: Data Definitions
Dyadic Variables
Conflict 
Cnfpi Intensity of Conflict between 
Pakistan and India, Scores 1 
(minor) when 25 to 999 battle-
related deaths and 2 (war) when 
at least 1000 battle-related 
deaths in a given year,
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Data set Version IV, Harbom et al. 
(2006)
Dur Number of days a conflict lasts in 
a year between Pakistan and 
India,
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State 
War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al. (2004) 
Fatal Annual fatality level of conflict 
between Pakistan and India, 
scores from 0 to 6
0 None
1-25 Deaths
26-100 Deaths
101-250 Deaths
251-500 Deaths
501-999 Deaths
6 >999 Deaths
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: COW Inter-State 
War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al. (2004)
Hiact Highest action by Pakistan and 
India in annual corresponding 
dispute [bracketed numbers refer 
to corresponding hostility level]
 
0    No militarised action [1]
1    Threat to use force [2]
2    Threat to blockade [2]
3    Threat to occupy territory [2]
4    Threat to declare war [2]
5    Threat to use CBR weapons 
[2]
6    Threat to join war [2]
7    Show of force [3]
8    Alert  [3]
9    Nuclear alert   [3]
10   Mobilisation   [3]
11   Fortify border  [3]
12   Border violation   [3]
13   Blockade [4]
14   Occupation of territory  [4]
15   Seizure    [4]
16   Attack     [4]
17   Clash       [4]
18   Declaration of war    [4]
19   Use of CBR weapons  [5]
20   Begin inter-state war   [5]
21   Join inter-state war    [5]
Years: 1950-2003, Source: COW Inter-State 
War Data, Version 3.02, Faten et al. (2004)
Hstlev  Annual hostility levels reached by 
India and Pakistan in each 
annual corresponding dispute
No militarised action
Years: 1950-2003, Source: Faten et al. (2004)
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Threat to use force
Display of force
Use of force
War
VolFatal Precise volume of fatality in each 
annual corresponding dispute,
Years: 1950-2003, Sources: COW Inter-State 
War Data, Version 3.02 (Faten et al. 2004), 
CSCW/PRIO Battle Deaths data (Lacina 2005), 
CSP Data set on Major Episodes of Political 
Violence 1946-2006 
http://members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm
Bi Lateral Trade
Tpitp Bilateral trade between Pakistan 
and India as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
total trade,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: Direction of Trade 
Statistics yearbook, IMF International Financial 
Statistics 2007 (IMF)
Tpit Bilateral trade between Pakistan 
and India as a ratio of India’s 
total trade,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: Direction of Trade 
Statistics yearbook, IMF International Financial 
Statistics 2007 (IMF)
Multilateral Trade
Xmpi Pakistan’s total trade (exports + 
imports) as a ratio of India’s total 
trade (exports + imports),
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2007 (IMF) 
Xmip India’s total trade (exports + 
imports) as a ratio of Pakistan’s 
total trade (exports + imports),
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2007 (IMF)
Lmpi1 Log GDP weighted average of 
Pakistan and India’s total 
imports,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 20067(IMF)
Lmpi2  Log mean average of Pakistan’s 
total imports as a proportion of 
Pakistan’s GDP and India’s total 
imports as a ratio of India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2008 (IMF)
Lxpi1 Log GDP weighted average of 
Pakistan and India’s total 
exports,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2008 (IMF)
Lxpi2 Log mean average of Pakistan’s 
total exports over Pakistan’s 
GDP and India’s total exports 
over India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2008 (IMF)
Military Burden
 
Lmilbrd1 Log of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP 
as a ratio of India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan
 
Lmilbrd2 Log of India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP as 
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
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a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s 
GDP,
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd 3  Log of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP 
as a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP 
plus India’s defence expenditure 
over India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd 4 Log of India’s defence 
expenditure over India’s GDP as 
a ratio of Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over Pakistan’s GDP 
plus India’s defence expenditure 
over India’s GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd5 Log of Mean average of India’s 
defence expenditure over GDP 
and Pakistan’s defence 
expenditure over GDP,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF) and 
Economic Survey of Pakistan 
Lmilbrd6  Log GDP weighted average of 
Pakistan and India’s defence 
expenditures,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02, World Development 
Indicators 2006 (World Bank), Government 
Finance Statistics Year Book (IMF), Economic 
Survey of Pakistan, Economic Survey of India
Lmilppi Log of Pakistan’s military 
personnel over Pakistan’s total 
population as a ratio of India’s 
military personnel over India’s 
total population,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02 and International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Lmilpip Log of India’s military personnel 
over India’s total population as a 
ratio of Pakistan’s military 
personnel over Pakistan’s total 
population,
Years: 1950-2007, Sources: Correlates to war 
data set version 3.02 and International Financial 
Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Economic Growth
Gpi Weighted average of real GDP 
per capita growth rates for 
Pakistan and India, 
Years: 1950 to 2007. Sources: Pakistan 
Economic Survey, Indian Economic Survey, 
International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
Democracy
Demopi Pakistan and India’s combined 
democracy score (by adding 10 
to India and Pakistan’s Polity2 
values for each year and then 
taking the product of these 
values in order to convert the 
variable in dyadic form),
Years: 1950-2007, Source: Polity IV Project 
(Centre for International Development and 
Conflict Management)
Population
Poppi Average of Pakistan’s total 
population and India’s total 
population
Years: 1950-2001, Source: International 
Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
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Appendix 2:
India Pakistan Peace Negotiations in 2006
Musharraf's Peace Proposals
 Pakistan gives up its claim to Indian-administered Kashmir if people 
from both regions have freedom of movement
 Neither part of Kashmir can become independent, but both can have 
a measure of self-governance
 Troops from both sides to be withdrawn in a staggered manner
 A joint mechanism to supervise both regions, in which people from 
India, Pakistan and Kashmir are represented
(BBC News: 7 Dec 2006)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
south_asia/6217734.stm
Indian Response
 “The destinies of our two nations are interlinked. We need to put the past behind 
us” 
(Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh: Pakistani Newspaper ‘the Nation’, 
December 21, 2006)
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OUTCOME: Kashmir rivals re-open trade route
An old trade route has reopened after 60 years across the Line of Control (LoC) that divides disputed Kashmir.
“Trucks carrying fruit, nuts and honey were flagged off by Indian officials from Salamabad in Indian-
administered Kashmir under tight security. Lorries are expected to arrive later on Tuesday from the Pakistani 
side, bringing rice, rock salt and furniture. The opening of the trade route is part of a 2004 peace agreement 
between India and Pakistan, which both claim Kashmir. The trade link follows other confidence-building measures 
introduced in Kashmir in recent years, including the opening of rail and bus links.” 
Drum Beating: The BBC's Altaf Hussain says the atmosphere in Salamabad, on the Indian side of the LoC, on 
Tuesday morning was festive. (Tuesday, 21 October 2008 12:15 UK) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/south_asia/7681320.stm
"I have always dreamed of going to the other side (of LoC), but I never thought I would be driving a lorry there 
so soon" 
Truck driver Mohammad Arif
30
ON THE SIDELINES of Peace:
Kashmir under indefinite curfew 
BBC NEWS: 24 August 2008
 The strikers want a referendum which they hope will lead to self-determination for the 
region. 
 Thousands of troops are enforcing the curfew in Srinagar
